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The Case of Namibia
Ravinder Rena
Namibia has experienced impressive growth since 21 years of indepen-
dence.Current gdp growthrates,estimatedat4–5,arefuelledmainly
by the increasing competitiveness of the mining sector. Mining sector
accounts for half of the national foreign exchange earnings. Low scores
on capital investment and education, however, is a considerable barrier
to greater economic diversification and may contribute to the poor in-
novation score. As a result, Namibia remains somewhat dependent on
foreign aid, despite relativelyhigh average incomes. This paper will dis-
cuss the impact of foreign aid on the Namibian economy by systemat-
ically analyzing its influence on developing countries using Namibian
economy as focus reference. Fifty years since the first official develop-
ment assistance (oda) programs were instituted, the question of the
effectiveness of foreign aid remains an unresolved issue. The purpose
of the study is to investigate whether foreign aid is effective in helping
Namibia to achieve development goals.
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Introduction
Foreign aid has long been a major topic of interest, both between gov-
ernments and in academic studies.1 Official aid is often criticized for not
havecontributedtoeconomicgrowthandpovertyreduction.Foreignaid
is always presented as altruistic endeavor on the part of industrial coun-
tries, the motivate is to help the Third World nations in Africa, Asia and
Latin America achieve progress and development similar to that of the
North. However, the impact of foreign aid in the last half century is not
impressive. If foreign aid was extended to arrest famine, disease, malnu-
trition, pandemics, and societal disorder, its goal has not been met and
i t si m p a c ti sm e a n i n g l e s s .T h i si sp a r t i c u l a r l yt r u ew i t hr e s p e c tt oA f r i c a
(Tseggai 2006).
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Asforeignaidremainsamajorsourceofincomeformanylow-income
countries in Africa, it is important to consider its implications for these
countries’ efforts to foster economic growth. Generally, realization of de-
velopment and prosperity need decades of hard work. But unfortunately,
intoday’sdevelopingcountriesespeciallyinAfricamostoftherulersand
theruledalikeseedevelopmentastheresultonlyofforeignaidanddonor
hand-outs, rather than people’s own efforts (Boone 1996; Tavares 2003).
However ,givenitsdismaldevelopmentrecords,Africafallsshortofbeing
able to provide its people with adequate resources, to have even the basic
capabilities to feed its population and prepare suitable ground for devel-
opment, the need for foreign aid in these countries seems indisputable.
Particularly, today, with soaring fuel and food prices, aid to Africa has
even become more essential and timely (Rena 2008).
Nevertheless, this does not mean that, these African nations should
submissively accept any political conditions that could open the gate for
foreignerstomeddleintheinternalaffairsofthecontinentasanexchange
for any sort of aid. Freedom of sovereign political decision should not be
compromised for any charity in the name of foreign aid. Foreign aid can
only be valuable, if the recipient country benefits from it in the reduc-
tion and elimination of poverty, inequality and unemployment through
promotion of work-culture. It can only be realized by bringing cultural
transformation to the existing deep-rooted dependency and parasitism,
throughhelpingpeopletohelpthemselves.Aidshouldnotbeconsidered
as a principal factor for development; rather it should only be regarded
as a necessary compliment to the domestic efforts nurtured by culture of
self-reliance and hard work, because aid cannot be depended upon in-
definitely. Besides, governments of Africa must be allowed to enjoy what
international political economic theorists call ‘the policy space’ to deter-
mine their own trade policies, and to set their development priorities
(Rena 2008). Aid can help, but it should be concentrated on countries
with good macroeconomic policy and governments genuinely commit-
t e dt oi m p r o v i n gp u b l i cs e r v i c e sa n di n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,a n ds t a m p i n go u t
corruption.
Some people may argue that, foreign aid rescued millions of people
around the world, by boosting their economic growth and by increasing
animpetustonationaldevelopment.Butinreality,only16WesternEuro-
pean countries, which received an aid package of about $13 billion, under
theMarshallPlanduring1948–1951,andsomecountriesineastAsia,par-
ticularly Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have been able to achieve devel-
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opment due to a major role-played by a huge external aid. This situation
has also its own peculiarity, both in terms of the amount given, and the
w a yi tw a su s e d ,a sw e l la st h ee x t e n to fp o l i t i c a lc o n d i t i o n sa t t a c h e dt oi t
(Rena 2008).
AccordingtoCowen(2003)theMarshallPlandidnoteverexceed5per
cent of the gross national product of the recipient nations. In the case of
Germany,notethatweweretakingmoreoutofGermany,intheformsof
reparationsandoccupationcostreimbursements(11to15percentofWest
G e r m a ngnp ) ,t h a nw ew e r ee v e rp u t t i n gi n .T h e nt h r o u g h o u tt h em i d -
1950s, Bonn repaid half of the aid it had received. Note that German eco-
nomicrecoveryfollowedfromliberalizationandreforms,whichpredated
Marshall Plan aid. In 1949–1950, our Marshall Plan aid to France was
roughly equivalent to French military expenditures abroad in Indochina
and North Africa. Of the European nations, arguably, Belgium recovered
from World War II most rapidly, and this happenedbefore MarshallPlan
aid kicked in.
Cowen (2003) further discussed that for example, at the end of World
War II, the Austrian economy was one of the most desperate in Europe.
Austria received high per capita aid sums, but the economy stagnated.
Austria later recovered, when it improved its monetary and fiscal poli-
cies. Marshall Plan supporter Franz Nemschak wrote: ‘The radical cuts
in foreign aid in the last year of the Marshall Plan and the stabilization
tendencies in the world economy forced Austria to make a basic change
in economic policy.’ Greece received high per capita aid as well, but had
ap o o rr e c o v e ry .
Many development economists agree that the effectiveness of Amer-
ica’s European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), by and large, was due to
limitedpoliticalconditionsthatrequiredtherecipientnationsonlytoco-
operateagainstcommunistexpansionandthewaythatamountofmoney
wasspent.AquicksurveyoftheMarshallPlanforinstance,showsthat;of
th e$1 3b illio nallo t t ed ,$3.4b illio nh a dbeens pen to nim po rtso fra wm a-
terials and semi-manufactured products; $3.2 billion on food, and fertil-
izers; $1.9 billion on machines, vehicles, and equipments;and $1.6 billion
on fuel (Rena 2008).
Moreover, the strategy followed in allocation of aid received by west
Europeans, under the Marshal Plan, makes certain that Europeans were
given not only aid, but also, their freedom of choice in determining their
priorities in allocation of a given aid. As a result, they were able to iden-
tify their exact shortcomings and used that aid to fund appropriately the
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projects intended to alleviate their real problems. But this is not case in
Africa; the donors dictate the terms and conditions of the aid where it
ultimately brings less result or no result (Mayer and Raimondos-Møller
1999; Collier and Dollar 2002; Masud and Yontcheva 2005; Rena 2008).
Thispaperdiscussestheimpactofforeignaidonthedevelopingcoun-
tries in Africa and with a special focus on Namibian economy by system-
atically analyzing its influence on least developed country’s (ldc) and
Upper Middle Income Countries using Namibian economy as focus ref-
erence. Most Aid was first officially extended for development purposes
during and after the Cold War. Fifty years since the first official develop-
ment assistance (oda) programs were instituted, the question of the ef-
fectivenessofforeignaidremainsanunresolvedissue.Forexample,Cape
Verde receives the highest net oda per capita ($438.2); Nigeria receives
the lowest ($9.5).2
Out of all the developing countries in Africa Namibia is used as the
casestudyofthisresearch;howevertheotherdevelopingcountrieswillbe
compared to the foreign aid of Namibia. This is mainly because Namibia
is a small open economy, which has pursued foreign aid. The purpose
of the study is to investigate whether foreign aid is effective in helping
Namibia to achieve development goals. When Namibia receives aid it is
used to fill the gap between savings and investment.
objectives of the study
Theobjectivesthatthisstudyhopestoinvestigateare:i)Analyzewhether
African countries should relay on foreign aid when pursuing economic
growth and development; ii) Analyze the main reasons why Namibia re-
ceives foreign aid whether there are any potential impacts the economy.
research questions
An attempt is made in this paper to highlight the features of foreign aid
and how they are tailored to parallel donor’s interests. In this case, the
typesofforeignaidextendedthroughbilateralandmultilateralprotocols
arediscussed.Furthermore,theimpactofforeignaidascanbemeasured
by goals and achievements are also analyzed. Are there altruistic foreign
aidprogramsspecificallytailoredtobringapositive changeineducation,
health, food production, transportation and industrialization? What has
beentheeffectofforeignaidintheAfricanContinent?Whenforeignaid
is not altruistic, what is the motivation? Is the motivation rational in the
sensethattheexpectedbenefitsareworththecosttorecipientanddonor?
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research methodology and data sources
The present study is mainly based on the secondary sources of data.
The data has been collected from different articles published in books,
Journals, magazines, websites. The data was also collected from research
books and reports. The data on Namibia was collected from the reports
of the u Commission and Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit
(nepru), books, internet, etc.
Thepaperhasbeenorganizedintofivesections.Thefirstsectiondeals
with the introduction and the second section provides the relevant lit-
erature of the study. Namibian economy and the aid related issues are
discussedinthethird section.Thefourthsection,devotedtoprovidethe
perspectives & discussion of the study and last section provides the sum-
mary and conclusions of the study.
Review of Literature
Recently there has been renewed interest in the reasons and effects of
foreign aid. The work of Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and
Alesina and Dollar (1998) analyses foreign aid flows for a large number
of years and countries and tests a number of hypotheses concerning the
effectivenessofaid,theallocationofaidbetweendifferentrecipientcoun-
tries,themotivesforgivingaid,etc.Thesepapers’resultsprovideanswers
to the many questions that have been put forward in the extensive litera-
ture on the economics of foreign aid.
Boone (1996) found that aid finance is consumption rather than in-
vestment.Financingconsumptionofafewpoorpeopleisnotsobad,but
the proponents of aid hoped for the kind of society-wide transformation
that would come from aid financing investment and growth. Some pro-
ponents have argued that aid could also buy time for reformers to im-
plement painful but necessary changes in economic policies. This seems
plausiblebuthasnotbeensystematicallytested.Onecouldtrytoalterthe
incentives to consume aid by tying transfers to purchases of investment
goods, as in Bruce and Waldman (1991).
Burnside and Dollar (2000) investigated the relationship between for-
eign aid, economic policy, and growth of per capita gdp using a new
databaseonforeignaidthathadbeendevelopedbytheWorldBank.They
run a number of regressions in which the dependent variable of growth
rates in developing countries depend on initial per capita national in-
come,anindexthatmeasuresinstitutionalandpolicydistortions,foreign
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aid, and then aid interacted with policies. ‘We find that aid has a positive
impactongrowthindevelopingcountrieswithgoodfiscal,monetary,and
trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.’ They
suggested that 1 per cent of gross domestic product in aid given to a poor
but well-managed country could increase its growth rate by a sustained
0.5 percentage points.
Further, the empirical literature on the connections between aid and
economic growth has been hampered by the lack of a clear theoretical
model by which aid would influence growth, and which could pin down
the empirical specification of the aid-growth relationship. For many
years, the standard model used to justify aid was the ‘two-gap’ model
of Chenery and Strout (1966). In this model, the first gap is between the
amountof investmentnecessaryto attaina certainrateof growth andthe
available domestic saving one between investment and saving, while the
second gap is the one between import requirements for a given level of
production and foreign exchange earnings. At any moment in time, one
gap is binding and foreign aid fills that gap.
Easterly (2001) tested the ‘financing gap’ model in which aid improves
investment and growth, using time series data. There are two steps in his
argument. First, foreign aid needs to increase investment. Next, invest-
ment needs to increase economic growth. He further discussed that how
many of these countries show a significant and positive effect of foreign
aid on investment, with a coefficient greater than or equal to one? There
are88 aidrecipientcountries on whichwe have dataspanningthe period
1965-1995.
First, Easterly (2001) considers a regression done for each country
where the dependent variable here is Investment/gdp and the indepen-
dent variable is Overseas Development Assistance oda/gdp. If aid in-
creasesinvestment,thenthecoefficienton this regression shouldbepos-
i t i v ea n dg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt oo n e .J u s ts i xo ft h e8 8c o u n t r i e sp a s s
this test. The magic six include two economies with trivial amounts of
aid: Hong Kong (which got an average of .07 per cent of gdp in aid
1965-1995) and China (average of 0.2 per cent of gdp). The other four
countries are Tunisia, Morocco, Malta, and Sri Lanka.
InthenextstepEasterly(2001)runaregressionforeachcountrywhere
the dependent variable is the growth rate and the independent variable
is the rate of investment.The coefficient fromthis regression canthen be
checkedtoseewhetheritfallsintotheplausiblerangefortheincremental
capital–outputratioofbetween2and5.Usingannualdata,fourcountries
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out of 88 pass the tests of a positive and significant relationship between
growth and investment, a constant not significantly different than zero,
and an icor between 2 and 5. The four economies that pass the tests are
an unusual assortment: Israel, Liberia, Reunion (a French colony), and
Tunisia (see also Easterly and Ross 1997).
According to Easterly (2001) ‘One of the more extreme cases of the
87 out of 88 countries that did not fit the model was Zambia. If Zambia
h a dc o n v e r t e da l lt h ea i di tr e c e i v e ds i n c e1 9 6 0t oi n v e s t m e n ta n da l lo f
that investment to growth, it would have had a per capita gdp of about
$20,000 by the early 1990s. Instead, Zambia’s per capita gdp in the early
1990s was lower than it had been in 1960, hovering under $500.’
The ‘financing gap’ model in which aid increases investment and then
thatinvestmentincreaseseconomicgrowthhasdubioustheoreticalfoun-
dations and numerous empirical failings. Yet no other model of aid and
growth hasarisen totakeitsplace.Thefinancinggapmodelcontinuesto
beusedtodayintheW orldBankandotherinstitutionsmakingaidpolicy
(Easterly 1999).
According to Bräutigam and Knack (2004) aid dependence cannot be
d i r e c t l ym e a s u r e d ,s ot h e yu s e dap r o x yt h a tr e fle c t s‘ a i di n t e n s i t y ’–n e t
aid flows as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp) and aid as a
percentageofgovernmentexpenditure.In1980,13sub-Saharancountries
were receiving net aid (aid inflows minus principal repayments) at lev-
els above 10 of gdp, by 1990, that figure had more than doubled, to 30
countries. In 1998, 21 countries continued to receive aid at that level. Al-
most all of them had been net recipients of aid flows at 10 of gdp for
1 0y e a r so rm o r e .I nan u m b e ro fc o u n t r i e ss u c ha sM a l a w i ,G h a n a ,a n d
Zambia, aid has funded more than 40 of government expenditures, on
average, for nearly 20 years (Bräutigam and Knack 2004).
Arellanoetal.(2009)investigatedinthecaseofIvoryCoastandfound
that as aid increases, it becomes an increasingly dominant influence on
economic developments in the model economy. For example, the cor-
relation coefficient between aid and gdp increases to 0.6 when aid is
equivalentto20of gdp relativetothe0.2correlationinthebenchmark
model. We observe similar shifts along the aid continuum in the rela-
tionship between aid and tradable output (a stronger negative relation-
ship) and non-tradable prices (a stronger positive relationship). Higher
aid levels can also rationalize a positive relationship observed in the data
between non-tradable prices and gdp because higher aid levels increase
both variables. The correlation between gdp and the non-tradable rel-
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ative price when aid inflows are on average 20 of gdp is equal to 0.4
(as compared to –0.7 with aid equal to 0 of gdp). Higher aid inflows
also increase the volatility of all variables in the economy. Consumption
volatilityincreasesfrom11to15relativetothebenchmarkmodelwhen
aid flows are increased to 20 of gdp. Investment and aggregate output
also become much more volatile with higher aid flows. Finally, the rela-
tive price of non-tradables is three times as volatile (12 compared with
4) when aid flows are 20 of gdp relative to the benchmark. Our re-
sultsshowthataidvolatilityisespeciallycostlyforeconomiesthatreceive
large aid inflows.
On the contrary, researchers like Moyo (2009a, 2009b), Rena (2008)
concluded that aid had no substantial impact on growth, savings or in-
vestment. Aid was shown to increase unproductive public consumption
(Mosley 1992). Aid is misallocated (donors give aid for strategic reasons
to the wrong recipients), aid is misused (recipient governments pursue
non-developmental agendas) and gdp growth is not achieved (Lensink
and White 2001). Most of the foreign aid Namibia receives is very spe-
cialized and when the donors pull out of the project they fall apart as
Namibia does not have the technical capability to continue the projects.
Excessive foreign aidalsoleadstotherecipientcountrybeingtoodepen-
dent on the donor’s country, which may lead to the infant effect on the
economy or misappropriation of funds (corruption). El Shibly (1984) by
usingSudanasalaboratorytestgroundacknowledgedthatforeigncapital
neither boosted economic growth nor abridges the gap between savings
and investment.
According to Chenery and Strout (1966), developing countries face
constraints on savings and export earnings that hamper investment and
economicgrowth.Aidflowsaremeanttofillthegapbetweeninvestment
needsanddomesticsavings,butthisstudyfacedseverecriticismvirtually
since its origin. Foreign aid is important to developing countries (ldcs)
and lower-middle income countries such as Namibia, because it is used
tofacetheireconomicandsocialchallenges’namely:poverty, hiv/aids,
malaria and other communicable diseases, unequal distribution of in-
come,inadequateeconomicgrowth,highlevelofunemployment,human
resource development and inadequate capacity.
More than $50 billion of foreign aid is given to African countries ev-
e r yy e a rt oa d d r e s sp o v e r t yo nt h ec o n t i n e n t .A l t h o u g ht h i sm a ys e e m
generous, and to some a solid strategy to treat Africa’s ailments, Dambisa
Moyo – a Zambian economist with a background that includes Harvard,
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Oxford and Goldman Sachs – says just the opposite. In her new book,
Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way
for Africa, Moyo claims that foreign aid has been ‘an unmitigated po-
litical, economic and humanitarian disaster.’ However, Moyo stated that
although she is not completely against humanitarian aid, she doesn’t be-
lieve ‘charity-based aid’ can provide long-term sustainable development
forAfrica.Herbiggest issue is with‘government-to-government aid,’and
funds from large monetary institutions like the World Bank. Moyo says
the $60 trillion of this aid that has been given in the past 60 years is
not working, evident from the fact that the number of Africans who
live on less than $1 day has doubled in the last 20 years. In addition,
most foreign government aid, she argues, has been pocketed by corrupt
politicians.
Moyo further vowed that foreign aid actually increases the risk of civil
conflict.People will take up arms to be in power because ‘the victor gains
virtually unfettered access to the package of aid that comes with it.’ Fur-
ther, Moyo said in an interview with the New York Times, trade, foreign
investments and microfinance opportunities can provide a better future
for Africans.
Several other researchers also addressed the problem of aid and eco-
nomic development. According to Bandow (2002) foreign aid has failed
despite the best efforts of many dedicated professionals. Bandow sup-
ported his clam by using African countries that received aid in 1970 and
1995, The United Nations Development Program reported in 1996 that
70 developing countries were poorer then than they were in 1980; 43
were poorer than they were in 1970. Bandow argument is supported by
Dambisa Moyo(2009a)also advocated that Limitless developmentassis-
tance to African governments has fostered dependency, encourage cor-
ruption and ultimately perpetuate poor governance and poverty, foreign
aid helps perpetuate the cycle of poverty and hinders economic growth
in Africa.
Is a voluntarytransferofresources fromone countryto another,given
at least partly with the objective of benefiting the recipient country? It
may have other functions as well it may be given as a sign of diplomatic
a p p r o v a l ,o rt os t r e n g t h e nam i l i t a rya l l y ,t or e w a r dag o v e r n m e n tf o rb e -
havior desired by the donor, to extend the donors cultural influence, to
provide infrastructure needed by the donor for resource extraction from
the recipient country, or to gain other kinds of commercial access. Hu-
manitarianism and altruism are nevertheless, significant motivations for
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giving of aid. Aid may be by individuals, private organizations, or gov-
ernments.
perspectives and criticism on moyo’s aid philosophy
As expected, Dambisa Moyo’s claims have raised serious criticism. In
an interview with Newsweek, one Campaign co-founder Jamie Drum-
mond says ‘Dead Aid’ is ‘a poor polemic, with nothing new of substance,
filled with anecdotal micro examples which ignore mountains of evi-
dence.’MadeleineBuntingfromtheGuardiancallsMoyo’s claims‘poorly
argued’ with ‘frequent pre-emptory glib conclusions.’
As Sharma (2009) quoted, Moyo blames ‘government-to-government
aid’ and ‘large developmental organizations’ like the World Bank, rather
than charity-based aid for Africa’s worsening situation. She says funds
from governments and the bank have not contributed to development
and in many cases are misused.
Sharma(2009)alsostatedthataccordingtoLauraMiller,MercyCorps,
‘the main objective of bilateral aid isn’t always humanitarian relief; it’s
also used to help strengthen fragile or strategic states and improve trade
relations with the West. Money from the World Bank is often geared
moretowardslargeinfrastructureprojectssuchaswatersystemsandroad
networks. Usually the recipient government is responsible for managing
funds given by the World Bank. Some countries’ governments are more
transparent and provide more oversight over aid money than others.’
Moyo does question the value of ‘charity-based aid,’ too. She says it
m i g h th e l pa f t e rad i s a s t e r ,b u ts a y si to n l yp r o v i d e s‘ b a n d - a i ds o l u t i o n s ’
andcan’tbethe‘platformforlong-termsustainablegrowth.’Herexample
is giving a young African girl a scholarship even though she’s unlikely to
find a job after finishing school. Even if Moyo is correct that after receiv-
ing an education it may be difficult for graduates to find work, education
i ss t i l li m p o r t a n t ,a n da i da g e n c i e ss u c ha sM e r c yC o r p sa r ew o r k i n gt o
help strengthen economic opportunities, although humanitarian agen-
cies cannot help everyone.
Namibian Case Study
profile of the country
Republic of Namibia is a country in Southern Africa with an area of
825,418 km2. Namibia is the world’s thirty-fourth largest country (after
V enezuela).Namibia ’ swesternborderistheA tlanticOcean.I tsharesland
borders with Angola and Zambia to the north, Botswana to the east and
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South Africa to the south and east. It gained independence from South
Africa on 21 March 1990, following the Namibian War of Independence.
ItscapitalandlargestcityisWindhoek.Namibiaisdividedinto13regions
and subdivided into 107 constituencies and a stable multi-party parlia-
mentary democracy (cia 2012).
Agriculture, herding, tourism and the mining industry – including
mining for gem diamonds, uranium, gold, silver, and base metals form
thebackboneofNamibia’seconomy.TheeconomyistiedcloselytoSouth
Africa’sduetotheirsharedhistory.Thelargesteconomicsectorsaremin-
ing (10.4 of the gross domestic product in 2009), agriculture (5.0),
manufacturing (13.5), and tourism. Namibia’s nominal gdp (2010 esti-
mate) – total $11.865 billion and the Per capita $5,651. However, accord-
ing to 2003 estimates the Gini-coefficient rate 0.66 (highest in the world
and the Human Development Index of Namibia is registered to be 0.606
(105thoutof174countries)in2010(cia 2012).Namibiahasapopulation
of 2.4 million people out of which little more than 50 (51.2) people
are unemployed and the nation has suffered heavily from the effects of
hiv/aids, with more than15of theadultpopulation infectedwith hiv
in 2007 (Republic of Namibia 2008).
Paradoxically based on per capita income, Namibia has moved from
lower middle country to the list of Upper Middle Income Countries by
April 2011 by the World Bank. However, the fact is approximately half
the population lives below the international poverty line of us $1.25 a
day. With this background, Namibia therefore receives foreign aid (Rena
2010; npc 2011; cia 2012). Although, Namibia has experienced impres-
sivegrowthsinceitsindependence,butthegrowthratewassloweddown
since 2005 and shown a negative growth of 0.8 percent in 2009. How-
ever, gdp growth rates, estimated in 2010 at 4–5, are expected to fuel
mainly by the increasing competitiveness of the mining sector (as indi-
cated by relative movements in price levels). Mining accounts for half of
nationalforeignexchangeearnings.Lowscoresoncapitalinvestmentand
education,however,isaconsiderablebarriertogreatereconomicdiversi-
ficationandmaycontributetothepoorinnovationscore(npc 2007).As
a result, Namibia remains somewhat dependent on foreign aid, despite
relatively high average incomes. As stated earlier that Namibia was clas-
sified as upper middle-income country (umc) by the World Bank but
the ground reality in the country is different and more than 50 percent
of the people are unemployed and large portion of people living below
povertyline. Further,due to legacies of its colonial andapartheidhistory
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Namibiahasoneofthemostunequaldistributionsofincomeandwealth
in the world (npc 2011).
The country also faces a number of other economic and social chal-
lenges,includingpoverty,the hiv/aids pandemicinadequateeconomic
growth, high levels of unemployment, inadequate capacity, and low lev-
els of industrialization, which also require additional resources. Given
the vulnerability of the economy to the unpredictability in international
financial markets, increased grant aid and concessional loans are the ap-
propriate means with which the international community should assist
Namibia(Blaauw,Oranje,andSchade1998).‘AidforTrade’andTechnical
Assistance (ta), should be provided, sustainable, and aligned to national
development plans and strategies.
However ,theaidflowshavecontinuedtodeclinesteadilyfromus$110
percapitainthe1990sto us $60percapitain2005.Inaddition,thenum-
ber of bilateraldonors active in Namibia declinedfrom 22 in the 1990sto
17 in 2006. Furthermore, donor assistance in the form of technical assis-
tance (ta) and other areas is not as enthusiastic and effective as it should
be.Thus,thereisanurgentneedtoanalyzeandidentifythewaysinwhich
the donor community should effectively assist.3
N a m i b i ah a sb e e nb e n e fi t t e df r o mt h ef o r e i g na i df o rm o r et h a n2
decades, it is also clear evidence that without donor aid Namibia can-
not sufficiently stimulate local enterprise and development, trigger off
foreign investment and create working opportunities for jobless people
i nt h ec o u n t r y .T h es e c r e to fs u c c e s sf o ra no p t i m i z e dd o n o ra i di st h a t
Namibia has to go for a stimulation of its economy without getting to
high debts. It has been the general opinion of the people in Namibia that
aid should be given without any strings attached to it and further the Vi-
ciousDonor Aid/Debt Circlehastobebrokenso thattheaid cansupport
the economy to grow. Therefore at this point of time, Namibia cannot be
better-off without foreign aid.
Discussion
In 2002 at the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on
Financing for Development highlighted the importance of increasing in-
ternational finance and technical cooperation for development. This was
followed by the initiatives of Multilateral Financial Institutions (mfis)
andtheDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteeoftheOrganizationforEco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (oecd-dac) to enhance and en-
sure the effective and efficient use of foreign aid.
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The Monterrey conference was followed by the Paris Declaration
(2005) that advocated for (i) harmonization of donor operational poli-
cies and procedures to reduce the transaction cost on aid recipient coun-
tries; (ii) alignment of aid to recipient country development priorities
and plans as articulated in National Development Plans; and (iii) Mutual
(donor and recipient) accountability for the results.
The Declaration also contained twelve indicators and targets, among
which is the reiteration of the need for the donor countries to fulfill their
commitmenttoprovide0.7oftheirGrossNationalIncome(gni)asaid
to developing countries.
Foreign aid or (development assistance) is often regarded as being too
much, or wasted on corrupt recipient governments despite any good in-
tentionsfromdonorcountries. Inreality,boththequantityandqualityof
aid have been poor and donor nations have not been held to account.
Further, in 1970, the world’s rich countries agreed to give 0.7 of their
gross national income as official international development aid (ida),
annually. Since that time, despite billions given each year, rich nations
have rarely met their actual promised targets (Hadjimichael et al. 1995).
For example, the us is often the largest donor in dollar terms, but ranks
amongst the lowest in terms of meeting the stated 0.7 target. Whereas
the small countries like Luxemburg, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden met
their promises.
Furthermore, aid has often come with a price of its own for the de-
veloping nations (Shah 2012): (i) aid is often wasted on conditions that
the recipient must use overpriced goods and services from donor coun-
tries; (ii) most aid does not actually go to the poorest who would need
it the most; (iii) aid amounts are dwarfed by rich country protectionism
that denies market access for poor country products, while rich nations
useaidasalevertoopenpoorcountrymarketstotheirproducts;and(iv)
largeprojectsormassivegrandstrategiesoftenfailtohelpthevulnerable;
money can often be embezzled away.
AsRena(2008)arguedthattheaidshouldnotbeseenasthepanaceato
allAfricancountries’problems.Instead,theymustbeallowedtotradeits
way out of poverty through utilizing its own resources, by reinforcing its
p a r t i c i p a t i o ni ni n t e r n a t i o n a lt r a d e .F o re x a m p l e ,c u r r e n t l y ,t h eA f r i c a n
continent accounts less than 4 of the global trade. But a further 1 per
cent increase in trade from Africa would be the equivalent of five times
the amount of aid the continent currently receives. Therefore, Africans
have to sort out their weakness and work to remedy them by developing
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goodpolicieswhichhelptoeffectivelyuseforeignaidinlinewithdomes-
tic resources (Rena 2008).
The aid should be ‘acceptable,’ so long as it represents an injection of
resources into the national economy that enables investment, and hence
growth. At the same time ‘it should not be acceptable’ with any sort of
criteria that may undermine freedom of sovereign political decisions, or
as a means to foster dependency rather than self-reliance (Rena 2008).
Moyo (2009a) observed that in 2002, the African Union (au), an or-
ganization of African nations, estimated that corruption was costing the
continent $150 billion a year, as international donors were apparently
turning a blind eye to the simple fact that aid money was inadvertently
fueling graft. With few or no strings attached, it has been all too easy for
the funds to be used for anything, save the developmental purpose for
which they were intended.
In Ethiopia, where aid constitutes more than 80 of the government
budget, a mere 2 of the country’s population has access to mobile
phones (the African country average is around 30). Might it not be
preferable for the government to earn money by selling its mobile phone
license, thereby generating much-needed development income and also
providingitscitizenswithtelephoneservicethatcould,inturn,spureco-
nomic activity?
There is a classic example, how the Aid is destabilizing the domes-
tic small and medium scale enterprises in Africa, for example, there is
a mosquito-net maker in small-town Africa. Say he employs 10 people
whotogethermanufacture500netsaweek.Typically,these10employees
supportupwardof15relativeseach.AWesterngovernment-inspiredpro-
gram generously supplies the affectedregion with 100,000free mosquito
nets. This promptly puts the mosquito net manufacturer out of business,
and now his 10 employees can no longer support their 150 dependents.
I nac o u p l eo fy e a r s ,m o s to ft h ed o n a t e dn e t sw i l lb et o r na n du s e l e s s ,
b u tn o wt h e r ei sn om o s q u i t on e tm a k e rt og ot o .T h ep e o p l ew i l lh a v e
depended more on aid and subsequently, the African governments once
again get to abdicate their responsibilities.
In a similar vein has been the approach to food aid, which historically
has done little to support the African farmers. Under the auspices of the
us Food for Peace program, each year millions of dollars are used to buy
American-grown food that has to then be shipped across oceans. One
wonders how a system of flooding foreign markets with American food,
which puts local farmers out of business, actually helps better Africa.
A better strategy would be to use aid money to buy food from farmers
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within the country, and then distribute that food to the local citizens in
need (Moya 2009b).
Africa remains the most unstable continent in the world, beset by civil
conflicts and war. Since 1996, 33 out of 55 countries in Africa have been
embroiledincivilwarsdirectlyorindirectly.AccordingtotheStockholm
InternationalPeaceResearchInstitute,inthe1990s,Africahadmorewars
thantherestoftheworldcombined.Africa’stragedyhasbeenwellknown
for a while now. Every African nation in crisis, from brutal civil wars in
Sudan, Angola, and Chad, not to mention Rwanda’s genocide and the re-
centcarnageintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,SomaliatoLiberia
has received billions of dollars from the West in the form of foreign aid
butstilltodaynearlyfiftypercentofthetheirpopulationlivesonlessthan
$2.5 a day. In July 2005, the g-8 agreed to double foreign aid to Africa,
from $25 billion a year to $50 billion to finance the ‘big push,’ as well as
to forgive the African aid loans contracted during previous attempts at a
‘big push’ (Rena 2008).
Moyo(2009a)arguedthattheproponentsofaidarequicktoarguethat
then $13 billion aid of the post-World War II Marshall Plan helped pull
back a broken Europe from the brink of an economic abyss, and that aid
c o u l dw o r k ,a n dw o u l dw o r k ,i fA f r i c ah a dag o o dp o l i c ye n v i r o n m e n t .
The aid advocates skirt over the point that the Marshall Plan interven-
tions were short, sharp and finite, unlike the open-ended commitments
which imbue governments with a sense of entitlement rather than en-
couraging innovation. And aid supporters spend little time addressing
themysteryofwhyacountryingoodworkingorderwouldseekaidrather
than other, better forms of financing. No country has ever achieved eco-
nomicsuccessbydependingonaidtothedegreethatmanyAfricancoun-
tries do. Further, economically successful countries such as China and
India, and Namibian neighbors like South Africa and Botswana. Their
strategy of development finance emphasizes the important role of en-
trepreneurship and markets over a staid aid-system of development that
preaches handouts. This is the time for Africa especially emerging coun-
try Namibia to exercise maximum discipline on how it manages its for-
eign aid. India, China, the West and other emerging powers are also try-
ing to provide aid to Africa to serve the people in Africa and also serve
their own interests.
Conclusion
To conclude that there is encouraging evidence that countries with good
track records of macroeconomic management, as well as good gover-
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nance, do better at development, whether measured as growth, literacy,
or infant mortality. Aid is more likely to have its intended impact where
governance and policy provide a solid foundation for development. The
task for the international community and aid-dependent countries alike
is to respond to the challenge of weak states by providing incentives for
goodgovernanceratherthantheincentivesforpoorgovernanceinherent
in the present system.
In line with this, Governments in Africa need to attract more foreign
direct investment by creating attractive tax structures and reducing the
redtapeandcomplexregulationsforbusinesses.Thereisadireneedthat
the African nations should also focus on increasing trade within Africa
and rest of the world especially China is one promising partner. Besides,
the Western countries can help by cutting off the cycle of giving some-
thing for nothing. It is time for a change towards development. It is ex-
tremely important to support the local economy because too much de-
pendence on foreign aid can crush the local economy, and it’s not sus-
tainable in the long run. Material aid is appropriate when goods cannot
beprocuredlocally.Someorganizationsuseasocialmarketingapproach;
instead of distributing goods for free, goods are sold through existing
markets, which ensures that this cycle can continue over the long term.
I n d e e d ,m a n yo fM o y o ’ ss o l u t i o n sc a nh e l pd e v e l o p m e n ti nA f r i c a ,b u t
it’s important to focus on all levels of society: the household level, the
communitylevelandtheinstitutionallevel.Asamatteroffact,weshould
not deny the honest contributions made by some ngos that focused on
economic development and provided an impetus for in the upliftment of
the socio-economic development of Africa. However, with the aid, there
is a need to promote demand-driven development, link producers with
markets, and foster entrepreneurship among the local population that
may bring sustainable development in the second largest and resource
rich continent.
All developing countries in Africa including Namibia (being a upper
middleincomecountry)needforeignaid,withoutanypreconditions.For
example, the donor country should not decide on what kind of projects
andissuesagivenforeignaidisspent.Furthermore,donorsusuallynever
offer a large sum of aid in cash that would possibly help to cover the re-
quirementsoftherecipientcountryinbudgetdeficit,ortofundanimport
ofnecessarymachineriesandotheressentialrawmaterialslike;fuel,food
and other commodities etc. Moreover, their decisions often give more
consideration to their national interests represented in terms of politi-
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cal or economic conditions, rather than to the real needs of the recipient
countries in Africa. Therefore, foreign aid in Africa has become contro-
versial. It is therefore strongly argued that the foreign aid is important
but not a panacea for the African economic development. Finally, it is
believed that, ‘do not give a fish to the people but teach them how to get
thefish.’Thiswillvirtuallystimulatethetradeanddevelopmentandsub-
sequently reduce dependency of foreign aid.
Notes
1 This article is revised version of the paper presented at the 8th African
FinanceJournalConferenceonthetheme‘EssentialDevelopmentFinance
Research for Africa’s Development’ held 14–15 April 2011 at Safari Hotel,
Windhoek, Namibia.
2 Please refer to http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0„contentMDK:20563739menuPK:
1613741pagePK:146736piPK:146830theSitePK:258644,00.html
3 Available at www.npc.gov.na (International Conference on Development
Cooperation with Middle Income Countries (mics), Madrid, Spain, 1–2
March 2007).
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